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1. How SHOULD THE NEW DNI ADDRESS DECENTRALIZED TERRORISM?

Decentralized terrorism represents a complex challenge for
any intelligence organization. In the aftermath of 9/11, military
and law enforcement agencies have made marked inroads at
destabilizing the more traditional formulations of terrorist groups.
This destabilization has caused these groups to morph often into
smaller, less-visible operational cells that are more loosely related
to-or even virtually independent from-any centralized
command-and-control entity.'
Within that realm, the most problematic appears to be that
practiced by lone-wolf actors. As Robert S. Litt, the General
Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) testified,
[T]he growing threat from individuals, both at home and
affiliation with foreign terrorist
abroad, whose
organizations, if any, is often vague. Although such
violent extremists come in many forms, they often operate
independent of one another and largely independent of
any organized terrorist group overseas such as al-Qa'ida.
Exactly how the DNI might address this issue requires some
explanation of his statutory role. Though a position like the DNI
had been discussed for decades, it did not actually come into being
until 2005 in an effort to address one of the key criticisms of the
9/11 Commission, namely, the lack of a coordinated intelligence3
gathering effort. The idea emerged that there needed to be an
intelligence czar to make certain that the often-segmented
intelligence community worked together collegially and shared

1. See generallyJOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41070, AL QAEDA AND
AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
POLICY
(2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf
(describing how al Qaeda has responded to "pressures from the security
community" and evolved into a "diffuse global network").

2. Reauthorizing the PatriotAct: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism
and Homeland Sec of the H. Comm. on thejudiciaiy., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
Hon. Robert S. Litt, Gen. Couns., Office of the Director of National Intelligence),

availableat http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20110309_testimony.pdf.
3. See RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41295, INTELLIGENCE
REFORM AFTER FIVE YEARS: THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

(DNI) (2010), availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41295.pdf; History of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT'L
INTELLIGENCE, http://www.dni.gov/aboutODNI/history.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2011).
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information on a timely basis to prevent another tragedy.
According to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, the DNI is supposed to ensure that the
President and other senior government officials receive
intelligence that is "timely, objective, independent of political
considerations, and based upon all sources available to the
intelligence community and other appropriate entities."6 That
said, the DNI is perhaps more of a coordinator as opposed to the
one responsible for the design of intelligence methodologies or the
actual gathering of intelligence.
The DNI does have-at least theoretically-influence over how
intelligence community resources will be spent.
Today that
community is very well funded, with spending having tripled in
little more than a decade to more than $80 billion. The Office of
the DNI itself now has a staff of more than 1,600 plus additional
contract personnel. Furthermore, statutory tools such as the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act
(FISA) give significant power to intelligence agencies to track
terrorists, although key FISA provisions are set to expire in May
2011.9
One must wonder, however, just how well the DNI concept is
working in practice. In a widely-reported incident in late 2010, a
television journalist caught DNI James Clapper off guard while
questioning him during a broadcast interview about the "widelycovered arrest of 12 men in an alleged terror plot in London." 0
4. See generally Thomas Fingar, Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
Promising Start Despite Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Animosity, in THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ENTERPRISE: NAVIGATING THE LABYRINTH 139-40 (Roger Z. George &
Harvey Rishikof eds., 2011) (detailing that post-9/11 assessments revealed the
inadequate information sharing among intelligence institutions).
5. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108458, 118 Stat. 3638.
6. § 102A(2), 118 Stat. at 3644.
7. Ken Dilanian, Overall U.S. Intelligence Budget Tops $80 Billion, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/28/nation/la-na-intel-budget
-20101029.
8. BEST, supra note 3, at Summary.
9. See generally EDwARD C. LIu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS
TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AcT (FISA) SET TO EXPIRE MAY 27,
2011 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40138.pdf (detailing
amendments that increased the ability of agencies to gather intelligence).
10. Bradley Blackburn, Dinrtor of NationalIntduewJams ap/r Not Bnd on London
Arrests
Before
TV
Interview,
ABC
NEWS,
Dec.
22,
2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/director-national-intelligence-james-clapperbriefed-london-arrests/story?id=12458010.
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Clapper was forced to admit he was unaware of the incident." The
intelligence community also came under fire in early 2011 for
seemingly failing to anticipate the seismic political events in the
Arab world, including the collapse of Hosni Mobarak's regime in

Egypt.2
Thomas Fingar argues that the substantial resources focused
on Iraq and Afghanistan has "inevitable consequences" for the
intelligence community's ability to monitor "developments
germane to other national security issues."" Yet there is also
In fact, one could argue, as
evidence of real effectiveness.
researchers John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart do, that-given the
relative paucity of incidents since 9/11 involving Americans-the
risk of terrorism today is actually "so low that spending to further
reduce its likelihood or consequences is scarcely justified.""
Clearly something must be working right since the inclination of
terrorist adversaries to harm Americans appears undiminished.
In any event, it would be a mistake to assume that the DNI can
solve the problem of decentralized terrorism by himself. A major
limitation on his authority is his obligation not to "abrogate the
statutory or other responsibilities of the heads of departments of
the United States Government or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency."" Almost by definition, the DNI is confined
to managing and advocating. But advocacy may be what is most
Consider this aspect of the decentralized terrorism
needed.
problem:
Techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on
small groups of plotters differ significantly from those
used to evaluate the military capabilities of other
countries, with a much higher need for situational
awareness of third world societies. U.S. intelligence
efforts are complicated b unfilled requirements for
foreign language expertise.'
11.
Id.
12. See, e.g., Kimberly Dozier, Spy Chiefs Defend Intelligence Community's
Performance, But Get It Wrong on Egypt Again, ASSOCIATED PRESs, Feb. 11, 2011,
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/spy-chiefs-defend-intelligence-community.
13. Fingar, supra note 4, at 150.
14. John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Hardly Existential: Thinking
Rationally About
Terrorism,
FOREIGN
AFF.,
Apr.
2,
2010,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart
/hardly-existential.
15. Exec. Order No. 13470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45325, 45329 (July 30, 2008).
16. RicHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33539, INTELLIGENCE
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Accordingly, the DNI could, for example, advocate for the
means to help fill needed foreign-language positions, even if the
heads of departments may choose to not give them the requisite
priority. Additionally, although not explicitly in the DNI's charter,
he could advocate for greater protection of civil liberties and
oversight." As the horror of 9/11 fades in the public mind, we are
beginning to see the first inklings of public opposition to intrusive
government activity in the name of counterterrorism. The DNI's
overt support for civil liberties and privacy protections could help
ensure the public support that a campaign against decentralized
terrorism demands.
Perhaps the best way to address this problem is to broaden the
number of actors concerned beyond the intelligence community.
Retired Army Brigadier General David Grange recently addressed
the issue of the decentralized nature of modern terrorist
organizations. 9 His solution looks well beyond the intelligence
agencies; in fact, he recommends the "incorporation and
synchronization of America's economic and private sectors into
government efforts, referred to as a 'Whole of Nation' approach."0
His belief that "private sector mobilization ... on a scale not yet
seen in the Global War on Terror" to address this threat is one well
21
worth serious consideration.

2. How SHOULD

AMERICA ADDRESS THE THREAT OF HOMEGROWN
TERRORISTS?

How America should address the threat of homegrown
terrorism, and how states might work to prevent radicalization of
certain ethnic groups, are rather different questions. Historically,
terrorism in this country has, in fact, often been homegrown. The

FOR
CONGRESS
at
Summary
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf.
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Civil Liberties in the Struggle Against
Terror, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 141 (John Norton Moore
& Robert F. Turner, eds., 2010).
18. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, What America Has Lost: It's Clear We Overreacted to
9/11,
NEWSWEEK,
Sept.
4,
2010,
at
18,
available
at
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/04/zakaria-why-america-overreacted-to-9-11
.html (discussing the emergence of the "national security state").
19. David Grange, Defeating Decentralized Terrorism, J. INT'L SEC. AFF.,
Fall/Winter 2010, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/19/grange.php.
20. Id.
21. Id.
ISSUES
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classic recent example is Timothy McVeigh who was executed for
his role in the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma
City that killed 168 people. Today, however, the most serious
threat is principally externally sourced in the extremist ideology
expressed by Osama bin Laden, his adherents, and other copycats.
A few homegrown terrorists have been dangerously radicalized by
it.

It is not surprising that extremists would welcome such
radicalization. As already suggested, it appears that terrorist groups
have come to realize that security measures taken since 9/11 have
made replicating the horrific events of 9/11 difficult. Organizing
terrorists overseas and deploying them to the United States involves
a number of steps that expose them to compromise. Thus, an evergreater effort has been made to recruit Americans and other
persons with ready access to the United States. Persons holding
valid American passports are of immense value to terrorist
organizations because they can travel more freely and with less
scrutiny.
Consequently, law enforcement has stepped up efforts to
Doing so has led to
identify potential homegrown threats.
investigations focused on particular groups, including cases where
informants have infiltrated mosques and posed as Islamic
22
extremists in an effort to draw out radicals. This effort has not
been without controversy as Attorney General Eric Holder learned
when he found himself answering charges of discrimination after
several FBI stings involving Muslims. 3 Holder insisted that without
such strategies "government simply could not meet its most critical
responsibility of protecting American lives."
Notwithstanding such techniques, some still criticize the
failure to focus more explicitly on Islamic extremism. For example,
after the tragic killings at Fort Hood, Texas, Senators Joseph
Lieberman and Susan Collins held hearings on the issue and
produced a February 2011 report castigating the Department of
25
Specifically, they blasted the DOD for not specifically
Defense.
22. Jerry Markon, Attorney General Eric Holder Defends Legality of FBI
Stings
Against
Muslim
Groups,
WASH.
POST,
Dec.
11,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/10
/AR2010121007733.html.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See SENS.JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN & SUSAN M. COLLINS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. AND Gov. AFFAIRS, A TICKING TIME BOMB: COUNTERTERRORISM
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naming the threat represented by the Fort Hood attack for what
,,16
they believe it was, that is, "violent Islamist extremism.
Shortly
thereafter, Representative Peter T. King held controversial hearings
focused on Muslims entitled "The Extent of Radicalization in the
American Muslim Community and that Community's Response."
It is important, however, to put this issue in context. As a new
report from the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland
Security points out, the number of terrorism cases involving
But more
Muslim Americans actually declined in 2010.2
importantly, the report shows that only 161 incidents of any kind
have occurred since 9/11. This figure is contrasted with the more
than 150,000 murders committed during the same time frame in
the United States.
Part of the effort to counter radicalization must be at the
national level. For example, the Congressional Research Service
concludes that the Internet is used by extremists as a tool "for
radicalization and recruitment, a method of propaganda
distribution, a means of communication, and ground for
training.,,sO Countering such web-based activities is best conducted
on a national level. Nevertheless, there is an important role for
local communities.
Brian Jenkins, one of America's foremost experts on terrorism,
testified before Congress that homegrown terrorism is best
deterred on the local level.3 ' Due to the individualistic quality of
US. GoVENMEw's FAILURES To PRvENr THE FoRr HOOD AIAcK (2011),
avaiabthttp://www.invesgtepmject.org/documents/tesimony/377.pdf
26. Id. at 1.
27. See The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that
Community's Response: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of Peter T. King, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.),
available at http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-%E2%80%9C-extentradicalization-american-muslim-community-and-communitysresponse%E2%80%9D.
28. CHARLEs KURZMAN, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC.,
MUSLIM-AMERICAN TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: AN ACCOUNTING (2011), availableat
http://sanford.duke.edu/centers/tcths/about/documents/KurzmanMuslimAmericanTerrorismSince_911_An Accounting.pdf.
29. Id. at 4.
30. CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R14674, TERRORIST USE
OF THE INTERNET: INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN CYBERSPACE AT SUMMARY (2011),
availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf.
31. Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving
Tool While Protecting Free Speech?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Brian Jenkins, Senior Adviser, RAND Corp.),
ISSONS FROM THE
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radicalization in the United States, Jenkins suggests the
government counter it "not through ideological or theological
debate with al Qaeda's online communicators, but by deterrence
through arrests, by treating terrorists and would-be terrorists as
ordinary criminals, [and] by stripping them of political
pretensions."3 1
Jenkins also believes, as do other experts, that gathering
intelligence is vital and that local police departments are best
placed to do so. While law enforcement, according to Jenkins,
needs to coordinate better at all levels, real progress requires a
close relationship with the communities where radicalization may
occur. This relationship creates an environment wherein tips and
warnings are provided to authorities. It may also result in the
"quiet discouragement"
of radicalization
and increased
"interventions by family members and friends."33
Analysts Jerome Bjelopera and Mark Randol note that
American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities need to "define
themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other
Americans, desire to help prevent another attack."'% Doing so,
however, also requires leaders outside such communities to strike a
fair and just balance between security and liberty. It is essential
that trust be built within the framework of preserving the freedom
of community members.
As the U.S. Attorney General rightly points out, "We don't
want to stigmatize, we don't want to alienate entire communities."
Few things could be more counterproductive than for that to
happen.
Cooperative community projects with all existing
immigrant populations can help build bridges and encourage
leaders of those communities to stand strong against terrorists that
might emerge from their groups.

available at http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2010052610153291592.pdf.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 6.
34. JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41416,
AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATTING A COMPLEX THREAT 4 (2010), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf.
35. Jeremy Pelofsky, Attorney General Warns against Alienating Muslims,
REUTERS, Mar. 9, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/10/us-usamuslims-holder-idUSTRE72907V20110310.
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3. IS PRESIDENT OBAMA'S USE OF PREDATOR STRIKES IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS?
Debates about strikes by remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs)
have generated a virtual cottage industry in academia and
elsewhere that continues unabated. The controversial report of the
UN Special Rapporteur Phillip Alston typifies the hostility of many
towards this weaponry." While grudgingly conceding that the
weapons are in fact legal, Alston nevertheless conjectures that
"commanders will be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on
who can be killed, and under what circumstances, too
expansively.""

All of this is pure speculation; indeed, there is utterly no
evidence that the commanders and operators concerned take
anything but a thoroughly professional approach to their
responsibilities. The evidence that does exist militates to the
contrary. For example, in January 2011, it was reported that
although the frequency of RPV strikes has increased in Pakistan,
the number of civilian casualties has actually decreased.3 9 This
parallels a March 2011 UN report concerning civilian casualties in
Afghanistan that found that "although the number of air strikes
increased exponentially, the number of civilian casualties from air
strikes decreased in 2010.,,40
As to the program's legal basis, Harold Koh, the Legal Adviser
36. For a description of an RPV, see MQ-1B Predator Unmanned
Aerial
Vehicle,
U.S.
AIR
FORCE
(uly
20,
2010),
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122.
See generally Christopher J. Bowie & Michael W. Isherwood, The
Unmanned
Tipping
Point,
AIRFORCE-MAGAZINE.COM
(Sept.
2010),
http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/September%202010/091Orpa.aspx.
37. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions,
Study on Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28,
2010) (by Philip Alston), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies
/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Tony Capaccio & Jeff Bliss, US. Said to Reduce Civilian Deaths After
Jan.
31,
2011,
Pakistan
Strikes,
BLOOMBERG,
Increasing
CIA
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-31/u-s-said-to-reduce-civilian-deathsafter-increasing-cia-pakistan-strikes.html.
40. U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG., AFGHANISTAN: ANNUAL REPORT 2010
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLIct, 24 (Mar. 2011), available at
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/March%20Po
C%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf.
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to the State Department, outlined the administration's position in
an address to the American Society of International Law in March
of 2010. This speech made it apparent that RPV strikes by all U.S.
entities are subject to a careful legal analysis and that targeting is
based upon established principles of international law. Essentially,
he contends that "[A]s a matter of international law, the United
States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban
and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and
may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense
under international law."42
Professor Mary Ellen O'Connell is the leading proponent of
the view that RPV strikes in Pakistan violate international law. 43
Much of her position is based on disputed facts such as the notion
that Pakistani sovereignty is being violated, or whether or not an
armed conflict exists outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent
reports undermine at least her first contention. For example, a
New York Times story published in March 2011 said that "publicly,
the Pakistani government and the powerful military condemn the
drone strikes, though privately they acknowledge their utility."4
What was unusual, the Times said, was that "[A] top Pakistani
general leading troops in the volatile North Waziristan region has
acknowledged the effectiveness of the American drone strikes
against foreign militants . . . ."

46

Still, occasional complaints about civilian casualties emerge.
In short, the international law rationale for the RPV strikes
that have occurred outside of Iraq and Afghanistan appears to be
supportable.
More problematic is the propriety of RPVs being
41. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, The Obama
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case
Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAw GOVERNING LETHAL
FORCE IN
CONTEXT
(Simon Bronitt, ed., forthcoming),
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 501144.
44. Salman Masood, PakistaniGeneral, in Twist, Credits Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/world/asia/10drones.html.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Alex Rodriguez, Pakistan Denounces U.S. Drone Strike, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/I8/world/la-fg-pakistandrone-attack-20110318.
47. See, e.g., Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors
Under InternationalLaw: An Analysis of the U.S. PredatorStrike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J.
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operated by persons other than uniformed members of the armed
forces. Although one respected scholar calls them America's own
unlawful combatants and insists that they are acting "contrary to
the laws and customs of war,",4 the better view seems to be that
civilian operation of the RPV systems is not itself a war crime.
Instead, they merely lose the immunity that uniformed combatants
enjoy in wartime and therefore may be subject to domestic
prosecution by a hostile state.
4. Is CURTISS-WRIGHT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER
CORRECT?

The 1936 case of U.S. v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.49 remains a
mainstay of the analysis of executive power in foreign affairs. It is
famous- perhaps infamous-for Justice Sutherland's quoting of
John Marshall's assertion (while a member of the House of
Representatives) that the "[t]he President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations."50
As Louis Fisher and others have pointed out, this
interpretation has been subject to considerable scholarly debate.
This debate has not, in any event, deterred the Supreme Court
from recognizing its own authority and role-and that of Congress.
According to Fisher, the "Court itself has not denied to Congress its
constitutional authority to enter the field and reverse or modify
presidential decisions in the area of national security and foreign
affairs.
Nevertheless, after 9/11, Curtiss-Wright became a
principle pillar of the unitary theory of presidential power that
marked the thinking of the Bush administration's expansive view of

INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331, 381 (2003) (concluding that a recent Predator strike
in Yemen was "an appropriate exercise of self-defense in the continuing war with
al-Qaeda that comported with the laws and customs of war"); Ryan J. Vogel, Drone
Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV.J. INT. L. & POL'Y 101,137-38 (2010)
(noting that "properly conducted drone attacks . . . do not violate the law of
armed conflict").
48. Gary Solis, CIA Drone Attacks Produce America's Own Unlawful Combatants,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpMar.
12,
2010,
WASH.
PosT,
dyn/content/article/2010/03/11 /AR2010031103653.html.
49. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
50. Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Louis FISHER, THE "SOLE ORGAN" DOCTRINE, STUDIES ON PRESIDENTIAL
POWER IN FOREIGN RELATIONS 28 (2006).
52. Id.
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the unilateral and exclusive nature of presidential authority. 3
Harold Koh, while an academic, argued in his 1990 book, The
National Security Constitution:SharingPowerAfter the Iran-ContraAffair,
that the Supreme Court's 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. SawyerH definitively rejected the interpretation of CurtissWright that seemed to authorize unfettered presidential power.
56
(often
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown
referred to as the Steel Seizure case) set forth his three-stage model
of presidential power, which argued that its highest expression
necessarily involved approval of Congress and its lowest ebb was
when the President acts contrary to the express or implied will of
Congress.5 '
Though Koh's endorsement of the Youngstown approach was
attacked by Bush lawyer John Yoo 8 and, more recently, by Professor
Robert Turner, it nevertheless appeared that Koh's rejection of
unfettered presidential authority would prevail under the Obama
administration. Indeed, as a candidate Senator Obama insisted
that "The President does not have power under the Constitution to
unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not
involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation., 0
53. See Sue Burum, ConstitutionalTheories of Executive Power: Effects on Current
and Future Decision Making in the Executive Branch and the U.S. Supreme Court, 33-2
NAT'L Soc. ScL.J. 28 (2010).
54. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
55. HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 211-12 (1990).
56. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 Uackson,J., concurring).
57. Id. at 636-37. Justice Jackson's model contends:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes
all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate
.... 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain .... 3.
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.
Id.
58. See generallyJohn Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE (2005) (pointing to
three major flaws in the traditional analysis of American foreign relations power).
59. See Robert F. Turner, U.S. ConstitutionalIssues in the Struggle Against Terror
in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 81, 96-102 (John Norton Moore
and Robert F. Turner, eds., 2010).
60. Charlie Savage, Barack Obama's Q&A, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2007,
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Initially, the Obama administration seemed wedded to the
Koh/ Youngstown formulation of presidential authority as to
national security issues. For example, in 2009 when the Justice
Department withdrew the Bush administration's definition of
"enemy combatant" for Guantanamo detainees, it crowed about the
fact that the revised definition does "not rely on the President's
authority as Commander-in-Chief." "' Instead, it drew authorit
from the AUMF as "informed by principles of the laws of war.'
Fast forward to 2011, and President Obama's exclusive reliance on
congressional authority fades. For example, when announcing
changes to the process of periodic review of detainees, the
President cited his own constitutional authority along with the
authority delegated to him under the AUMF.r3
Perhaps the most graphic example of the Obama
administration's reversion to more traditional presidential
conceptions of executive power, A la Curtiss-Wright, is reflected in
his report to Congress about the initiation of hostilities in Libya in
March of 2011. Specifically, President Obama stated that he took
the action- without a declaration of war or other, explicit
congressional authorization-pursuant to what he described as his
"constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as
commander in chief and Chief Executive.6 Thus, the Curtiss-Wright
approach to executive power seems to retain a strong measure of
vitality; indeed, we may see it ever more frequently relied upon by
the Obama administration even as it disavows formal adherence to
the Bush administration's Curtiss-Wightexultation of the sole-organ
conceptualization of presidential power.
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA
(quoting Sen. Barack Obama).
61. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Withdraws
"Enemy Combatant" Definition for Guantanamo Detainees (Mar. 13, 2009),
availableat http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag232.html.
62. Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the Gov't's Detention Auth.
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Litigation, No. 05-0763 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2009), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
63. Exec. Order No. 13567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13, 277 (Mar. 7, 2011) ("By the
authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including the Authorization of Military Force of September
2001 . . . I hereby order as follows .. . .")
64. Press Release, The White House, Letter from the President Regarding
Commencement of Operations in Libya (Mar. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-presidentregarding-commencement-operations-libya.
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5. HAS PRESIDENT OBAMA IMPROVED BUSH'S NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICIES?

Many observers of all political stripes believe that the Obama
administration's policies are remarkably consistent with those of
President Bush's second term. As Professors Jimmy Gurul and
Geoffrey Corn put it:
Contrary to the hopes of many of the supporters of
candidate Obama, President Obama does not appear to
be willing to abandon the wartime model for dealing with
transnational terrorism. Instead, like his predecessor
President Bush, he has continued to invoke all
components of national power, including the military
component, to deal with differing aspects of the struggle
against transnational terrorism.
With some important exceptions, 6 there is little to dispute such
assessments. It should be said, of course, that one of Obama's first
acts as President was to forbid (via executive order) torture and
revise other harsh interrogation practices." In addition, as Harold
Koh notes, the administration has taken what may be called a
friendlier approach to such international institutions as the
International Criminal Court and the UN's Human Rights
Council.69 Whether these are deemed improvements is obviously a
matter of perspective.
What is particularly interesting is that for all its rhetoric about

65. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed, More Continuity Than Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15ihtedbellinger.html ("[T]he international community may find that there will be
more continuity than change between the Bush administration's pragmatic second
term and the Obama administration."); Kenneth Roth, Empty Promises? Obama's
Hesitant Embrace of Human Rights, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 2010,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66034/kenneth-roth/empty-promises
(discussing the Obama administration's shortcomings on human rights issues).
66. JIMMY GURULi & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM
LAW x (2011).
67. See e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ASSESSING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S
RECORD OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL
SECURIY POLICY (2011),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-

content/uploads/HRF-Natl-Sec-Rep-Card.pdf (giving President Obama high
marks on "standing firm against" torture and secret detention but chastising him
over his policy on detainee review, indefinite detention, and "accountability of
torture").
68. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
69. Koh, supra note 41.
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71

open government, the Obama administration's actions tend to
demonstrate otherwise. The Associated Press reported that "[t]wo
years after Obama pledged to reverse the Bush administration's
penchant for secrecy .. . [requestors] grapple [] with many of the
same frustrating roadblocks and head-scratching inconsistencies."7 '
Further, the Obama administration fought to prevent disclosures
under the Freedom of Information Act about the Navy's storage of
explosives at a base in Washington State by claiming an exemption
designed for internal personnel rules, only to be handed a 8-1
defeat by the Supreme Court.
President Obama's administration is proving itself to be ust as
The
aggressive as Bush's in asserting the state secrets privilege.
administration successfully invoked the privilege to block a lawsuit
Now the
on behalf of five extraordinary-rendition victims.74
administration is not only battling to assert the privilege to block
civil litigation in cases involving Boeing and General Dynamics
before the Supreme Court,75 it also raised state secrets to bar
inquiry into allegations that a U.S. citizen accused of terrorism
activities was marked for an unlawful extrajudicial targeted killing.
Furthermore, the Obama administration is proving to be just
as uncompromising as the Bush administration with respect to
domestic surveillance. It vigorously defended-and lost-a lawsuit
arising out of a now-defunct Bush-era program that permitted the
National Security Agency to "monitor phone calls. . . Internet
activity and other electronic communications entering or leaving
In 2006, the Justice
the U.S." without getting warrants.
Department argued that what it described as a terrorist surveillance
70. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Justice Department Increases
Transparency with Launch of FOlA.gov Website, Commemorates Sunshine Week
(Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 1/March/1 1-opa321.html.
71. Famihar Bamers Slw axna's Tmnzn/ncy Drig AOOiATED PRS, Mar. 18, 2011,
htp://news&yahoo.com/s/ap/20110318/ap-onue us/utssunshine weekfoia_files.
72. See Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 1259 (2011).
73. See generally State Secrets Privilege, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/state-secrets
.privilege/index.html (describing the state secrets privilege).
74. See Mohamed et al. v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
75. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. et al. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2011).
76.

SeeAl-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 52 (D.D.C. 2010).

77. William Mathews, DoD to Protect Some Civilian Infrastructure,DEFENSE
Oct. 18, 2010, at 6.
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program could legally bypass FISA procedures because the
President's authorization to do so was incident to his commanderin-chief authority.
Nevertheless, in late December of 2010 U.S. District Court
Judge Vaughn Walker ordered the "government to pay more than
$2.5 million in lawyer fees and damages after he concluded
investigators wiretapped the phones of a suspected terrorist
organization."7 9 In another development, a court for the first time
granted standing to a variety of groups to challenge FISA
surveillance.o The point is that the Obama administration is
essentially fighting the same fights against civil libertarians as the
Bush administration did, just less effectively.
Moreover,
Time Magazine reports that the Obama
administration is "rapidly establishing a record as the most
aggressive prosecutor of alleged government leakers in U.S.
history."' Of particular concern to civil libertarians is the report
that, in connection with one of the investigations, federal
authorities obtained New York Timesjournalist James Risen's "credit
reports, credit-card and bank statements and airline-travel
The application of such investigatory tactics against a
itineraries.
bona fide journalist is very unusual and troubling.
Finally, the Obama administration's controversial decision to
engage in hostilities in Libya without a declaration of war-or
much in the way of consultation with Congress-is consistent with
approach taken during the Bush administration. Again, on balance
the policies of the Obama administration are in most respects
indistinguishable from those of Bush's second term. To the extent
their policies may differ, Obama's policies tend to be more
aggressive.
78.

See U.S.

TERRORIST

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT
at
available
REALTY
(2006),
MYTH
V.
ATTACKS:

http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/nsa-myth-vreality.pdf.
79. Paul Elias, judge Orders Feds to Pay $2.5 million in Wiretapping Case, WASH.
2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news
Dec.
22,
TIMEs,
/2010/dec/22/judge-orders-feds-pay-25m-wiretapping-case/.
80. See Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, No. 09-4112-CV, 2011 WL 941524, at
*25 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2011); see also Mark Hamblett, 2nd Circuit Grants Standing in
Challenge to FISA, N.Y. L. J., Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.1aw.com/jsp
/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTNjsp?id=1202487847765&2nd CircuitGrants_
Standing-inChallengetoFISA&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
81. See Mark Benjamin, Wdileaks and Whisthbloeres: Obama'sHarl Line, TIME, Mar. 11,
2011, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2058340,00.html.
82. See id.
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6. SHOULD KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMED EVER BE BROUGHT TO
TRIAL?
Of course Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) should be
brought to trial. KSM is not just another insurgent picked up on
the battlefield. He is the alleged architect of 9/11. It would be a
disservice to the victims and, more generally, to accepted notions of
justice not to try him. As Senator John Cornyn says, "The families
of those who died have waited 10 years, and they deserve, at long
last, the peace of mind and closure that [the trial of KSM and
others] will bring.",8
The central question appears to be not so much about the
wisdom of a trial per se but rather which forum should be utilized.
The Obama administration's plan to try him and others in
domestic civilian courts foundered under a storm of political
opposition by an electorate concerned with the dangers of bringing
Further, there are
alleged terrorists into the United States.8
evidentiary issues related to KSM having been waterboarded as
many as 183 times. Such issues could thwart the admission of
evidence as it did in the case of Ahmed Ghailani, who faced
charges related to the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998.
Ghailani's trail was complicated by a ruling by Judge Lewis A.
Kaplan that a major prosecution witness could not be called
because his discovery was the fruit of a tree poisoned by coercive
85
interrogation techniques. Thereafter, Ghailani was acquitted on
279 of the 280 charges against him. This result does not bode well
for such prosecutions, even though the White House insists that the
Ghailani verdict does not undermine their intent to hold terrorists
86
accountable in criminal forums.

83. Press Release, Sen. John Cornyn, Cornyn Applauds President for
Reconsidering GITMO/Military Tribunals (Mar. 8, 2011), available at
http://comyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=NewsReleases&ContentRecordid
=cacd686f-7331-48a7-a27a-3dafccfb8470.
84. Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Opposition to U.S. Trial Likely to Keep
Mastermind of 9/11
in Detention, WASH.
PosT,
Nov.
12,
2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/12
/AR2010111207508.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
85. Benjamin Weiser, judge Bars Major Witness from Terrorism Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/nyregion/07ghailani.html.
86. Anne E. Kornblut & Peter Finn, White House UndeterredAfter Ghailani Terror
Case Verdict, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/17/AR2010111705663.html.
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When Congress put civilian trials out of reach by barring the
use of DOD funds to transfer detainees to the United States, the
President made it clear that the prohibition "represents a
dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical executive
branch authority to determine when and where to prosecute
Guantanamo detainees, based on the facts and the circumstances
of each case and our national security interests."7 And indeed it
does seem that such decision ought to be left to the executive
branch.
Regardless, it certainly seems that, as the President said, the
"prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is a powerful tool in our
efforts to protect the Nation and must be among the options
available to us."" In any event, the March 2011 decision to restart
military commissions at Guantanamo may represent the best nearterm opportunity to put KSM before a tribunal capable of holding
him accountable.
7. IS THE THREAT POSED BYA NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN AS SERIOUS AS
THE P5+1 (UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, RUSSIA, CHINA,
FRANCE, AND GERMANY) REPRESENT IT TO BE?

The Iranian nuclear program is one of the most vexing
national-security issues of our era.90 It is impossible to know what
governments really think about the threat posed by the possibility
of a nuclear-armed Iran, but there is also no reason to discount
their public statements. For its part, the United States has made it
"clear that Iran must not develop nuclear weapons."9' That said,
American officials seem to be acquiescing to Israeli estimates that
sanctions are working to delay Iran's nuclear weapons program,
87. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressat
7,
2011),
available
(Jan.
office/2011/01 /07/statement-president-hr-6523.
88. Id.
89. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on
2011),
available at
(Mar.
7,
Detainee
Policy
and
Guantanamo
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actionsguant-namo-and-detainee-policy.
90. See generally Iran's Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran
/nuclear .program/index.html.
91. U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic Republic of Iran: Hearing Before the S. Armed
Serv. Comm., 110" Cong. (2010) (statement of Amb. William J. Burns, Under Sec'y
of State for Political Affairs), available at http://armed-services.senate
.gov/statemnt/2010/04%2OApril/Burns%2004-1410.pdf.
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possibly until 2015.92
The more interesting question is to what degree the threat
would justify acts of force. In his testimony last December, Under
Secretary of State William J. Burns explained that the Obama
administration was pursuing diplomatic avenues as well as sanctions
in a bid to halt Iranian nuclear weapons development.9 3 Nothing
in his testimony explicitly ruled out force. Nor was force ruled out
in January 2011 when President Obama described his meeting with
French President Nicolas Sarkozy. He remarked that with respect
to Iran's nuclear program they discussed sanctions, as well as their
"hope that we can resolve this issue diplomatically."9 4 Force, it
appears, is on the table if the hoped-for diplomatic solution fails.
As most international lawyers appreciate, the UN Charter
requires nations to "refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."95 The only textual exceptions to that
prohibition are acts authorized by the UN Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter,96 or actions in self-defense.9 ' With
respect to the latter, the concept of anticipatory self-defense is
recognized by the United States, albeit not by all nations." This
permits the use of force prior to an actual armed attack but only
when the threat is, among other things, imminent. Factually, that
does not appear to be the case with the Iranian nuclear weapons
program.
What does imminent really mean today? Professor Ken
Anderson argues that, at least since 1980, the United States has
taken the position that "imminence can be shown by a pattern of
activity and threat that show the intentions of actors."' 9 This can
92.

Stephen Kaufman, Clinton: Iran Sanctions Working, Need to be Maintained,
(Jan.
10,
2011),
http://www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2011/January/20110110120608nehpets4.630679e-02.html.
93. William J. Burns, Implementing Tougher Sanctions on Iran: A Progress Report,
Statement Before the H. Foreign Affairs Comm., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/152222.htm.
94. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by President Obama and
President Sarkozy of France After Bilateral Meeting (Jan. 10, 2011), availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201 1/01/10/remarks-presidentobama-and-president-sarkozy-france-after-bilateral-mee.
95. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
96. See U.N. Charter ch. VII.
97. U.N. Charter art. 51.
98. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAw 6 (2010).
99. Id.
100. Benjamin Wittes, Kenneth Anderson on Baumann v. Wittes, LAWFARE (Dec. 1,

AMERICA.GOV
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satisfy imminence, he says, "whether or not those intentions are
about to [be] acted upon."'0 ' Is such an approach appropriate to
prevent the use of such a horrific device as a nuclear weapon? The
1991 Israeli raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor was strongly condemned
at the time, even as some scholars insist on its legality.102
More recently, however, there have been reports of the use of
a computer virus called Stuxnet that allegedly operated so as to
destroy centrifuges essential to Iran's nuclear program. o0 Many
experts contend that the sheer sophistication of the virus suggests
nation-state involvement and, therefore, given the destructive
results, would seem to violate the UN Charter's prohibition on the
use of force. 04 Yet protestations about its illegality-while extantare relatively muted, perhaps because of the significant
international opprobrium that has already been heaped upon Iran
for its failure to conform to various efforts aimed at ensuring it
does not acquire nuclear weapons.
It may also be the case that this relatively muted response is
reflective of something of a new norm arising vis-a-vis weapons of
mass destruction. It is interesting that in the International Court of
Justice advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, the devices were
condemned as "generally. . . contrary to the rules of international
law," yet at the same time the court conceded that it could not
conclude that they are "unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake."' 05
Thus, in an era when horrific weapons of mass destructionnuclear, chemical, biological, and even cyber-based-seem to be
becoming within the grasp of a variety of state and, perhaps

2010, 5:09 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/kenneth-anderson-onbaumann-v-wittes/.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Against the Osiraq Reactor: A
Retrospective, 10 TEMPLE INT'L & COMp. L.J. 259, 259 (1996) (arguing that Israel "did
the world a great service" by bombing Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor and that it was
done in accordance with international law).
103. Norman Friedman, Virus Season, PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2010, at 88.
104. See generally, Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in InternationalLaw: The
Use of Force, Collective Security, Self-Defense, and Armed Conflict, in PROCEEDINGS OF
WORKSHOP
ON
DETERRING
CYBERATrACKS
163-64 (2010),
available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=12997&page=151
(distinguishing the use of force and armed attack with respect to cyber attacks by a
nation-state).
105. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 266 (July 8).
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someday, non state actors, the international community may
develop a new view of anticipatory self-defense. It is possible that a
consensus could emerge (that includes nations who otherwise take
a narrow view of self-defense) that tolerates a more aggressive
approach but only in instances of the exceptional and extreme
circumstances outlined by the ICJ, namely, those in which the
survival of a state is at stake.106
9. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS TO
PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION USED IN DOMESTIC COURTS TO
PROSECUTE TERRORISTS?
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) does
provide adequate safeguards to protect classified information in
federal prosecutions.
Enacted in 1980, it was intended to:
provide a means for determining at an early stage whether
a "disclose or dismiss" dilemma exists in a potential
prosecution or whether a prosecution may proceed that
both protects information the Executive regards as
sensitive to security and assures the defendant a fair trial
consistent with the mandates of the Constitution.108
Federal prosecutors recently described CIPA as providing:
[P] retrial, trial, and appellate procedures for federal
criminal cases in which the public disclosure of classified
information potentially exists. Utilizing these procedures,
typically through ex parte and/or in camera hearings, the
court can address and resolve issues concerning the
discoverability of classified information by the defendant,
and the government can learn prior to trial whether or
not classified information will have to be disclosed in
open criminal proceedings. This allows the government
to make an informed decision concerning the costs of
going forward with the prosecution.
None of this is to suggest that cases involving classified
106. Id. at 266, 317.
107. Classified Information Procedures Act, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. app. III, §§ 1-16 (1988)).
108.

LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 89-172A, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

PROCEDURES
ACT
(CIPA):
AN
OVERVIEW
(1989),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/89-172.pdf.
109. Gov't's Motion for Pretrial Conference Under Section 2 of the Classified
Info. Procedures Act at 2-3, United States v. Drake, No. RDB 10 VR 1081, (D. Md.
May 5, 2010), availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/drake/050510-cipa.pdf.
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information-virtually all terrorism cases-are easy to litigate, even
with CIPA.
Classified information typically requires judges,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and court staff to obtain security
clearances, and that process can involve significant time and
resources. In addition, court facilities may require modification to
accommodate securing classified material.
Moreover, some commentators like Professor Radsan argue
that CIPA is "showing its age" and needs a "remodeling."" 0 Radsan
argues that CIPA should be revised to provide:
First, a prosecutor's discovery obligations should apply to
the intelligence community only when it has most actively
participated in the investigation .

...

Second, the courts,

Congress, or a combination of the two should allow the
sensitivity of classified information to affect its use at trial.
On a close call, the court should be less inclined to admit
top-secret information than information at a lower level of
Third, the courts, Congress, or a
classification ....
combination of the two should allow small portions of
trials that involve classified information to be closed to the
public."
Congressional action may be forthcoming, though perhaps not
Senator
exactly along the lines Professor Radsan proposes.
Benjamin L. Cardin has introduced a bill to revise CIPA in ways
that would take into account the case rulings and other
developments since CIPA's enactment." Interestingly, he wants to
model it much after the updated provisions found in the Military
According to Senator Cardin, the
Commission Act of 2009.
legislation would "ensure that all classified information, not just
documents, will be governed by CIPA, and that prosecutors and
defense attorneys will be able to fully inform trial courts about
classified information issues that may arise during the course of
. ,114
criminal proceedings."
110. Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA), 32 CARDOZo L. REv. 437, 483 (2010).
111. Id. at 482-83.
112. Classified Information Procedures Reform and Improvement Act of 2010,
S. 4050, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/CRIA-FINAL.pdf.
113. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2009%20MCA%20Pub%20%2OLaw
%20111-84.pdf.
114. See Press Release, Sen. Benjamin L. Cardin, Cardin Introduces Legislation to
Improve How Classified Information is Used in Espionage, Terrorism and Narcotics Cases
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The fact that upgraded procedures are already incorporated
into the military commission process might make greater utilization
of that forum more enticing. In addition, while Boumediene v.
Bush"' held that the constitutional right to habeas exists at
Guantanamo, it is not clear what, if any, additional constitutional
rights otherwise applicable to criminal trials are necessarily
mandated for military commissions. Accordingly, it is possible
some of the discovery and evidentiary concerns that Professor
Radsan identifies as troubling in conventional civilian prosecutions
may be eased by trial by military commission.
Still, it is possible that certain cases will be hobbled by the
need to disclose classified information under either forum. In
some instances, the government may be obliged to forego certain
prosecutions if the necessary disclosure of classified information
represents too great a risk to national security. This option may be
less odious when applied to those potential defendants who are
unlikely, in any event, to be released if acquitted because they are
still subject to law-of-war detention.
Too aggressive risk taking in this regard may present serious
problems. In his memoir, Known and Unknown, former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld contends that during the trial of Omar
Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh," who was convicted of seditious
conspiracy in a scheme to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993,
prosecutors were obliged to turn over a list of 200 possible
(Dec. 20, 2010).

See also Senator Cardin's floor statement introducing the bill:

This legislation . . . will codify, clarify, and unify Federal case law

interpreting CIPA; ensure that all classified information, not just
documents, will be governed by CIPA; ensure that prosecutors and
defense attorneys will be able to fully inform trial courts about classified
information issues; and will clarify that the civil state secrets privilege
does not apply in criminal cases. [This legislation] will also ensure highlevel DOJ approval before the government invokes its classified
information privilege in criminal cases and will ensure that the Federal
courts will order the disclosure and use of classified information when
the disclosure and use meets the applicable legal standards. This
legislation will also ensure timely appellate review of lower court CIPA
decisions before the commencement of a trial, explicitly permit trial
courts to adopt alternative procedures for the admission of classified
information in accordance with a defendant's fair trial and due process
rights, and make technical fixes to ensure consistent use of terms
throughout the statute.
171 CONG. REc. S10816 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cardin),
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position
available
=all&page=S10816&dbname=2010_record.
115. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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coconspirators. According to Rumsfeld,
This told al-Qaida which of its members had been
compromised and indicated where U.S. intelligence had
gleaned its information. Bin Laden reportedly was
reading the list several weeks later in Sudan. He must
have been shaking his head in contemptuous wonder at
how effectively the United States was assisting him in his
deadly jihad.
Thus, while the procedures are generally workable, there will
always be a tension between what should-or must-be disclosed,
and the potential consequences for doing so. As frustrating as it
may be at times, this is the price one must pay in a democratic
society that honors the rule of law.
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